In the study of history, we generally focus on the "what" part and seldom on "why". While what is factual and harmless, the why is both painful and accusatory. The advantage of hindsight is that it can turn yesterday’s brilliance into today’s blunder and yesterday’s success (or the notion of it) into today’s disaster.

The departure from an ideology, or the adjustment, is a leadership’s decision but the critical factor is the very nature of the decision-making process and prowess. The Afghan problem resides in its turbulent history, geography and the power contestation – both within and outside. Common Afghans have hardly had much role in the devastation that they have endured for so long. The Afghan destiny has mostly been decided by external forces. The states that have impacted Afghanistan have their own idiosyncrasies, prejudices, ideologies, beliefs, cultures, economic / military might, national character and political systems.

Examining the decision-making process of the major powers that impacted Afghanistan reveals how Afghans have been impacted. America, for instance, behaves like s bull in a china shop, it acts fast but not always right or with foresight. It can win wars fast, but peace slowly (Japan, Angola, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria) while China applies ancient patience and positional advantage rather than confrontation.

Russia’s decision-making excels in total war but collapses in complex crises requiring consultation and modesty. India’s strategic thought is ancient and its execution is paralysed when it fails to replace Nehru’s idealism with Chanakya’s Machiavellian thoughts.

Pakistan, with strategic resilience and under constraint acts, as a survival state remaining flexible and adaptive to challenges with core principle around denial, deterrence and diplomacy.