MUSSOLINI and Claretta Petacci, his mistress, were captured by the Italian Partisans on Friday, April 27, 1945, at Dongo, Province of Como. They were shot the next day on a deserted country road in the hill country above Lake Como. Their bodies, as well as those of several Ministers and other prominent Fascists who were executed on the same day at Dongo, were taken to Milan later in the evening. The next morning, Sunday, April 29, a frenzied crowd hung the bodies by their feet in the public square — the Piazza Loreto.

A few hours later, the bodies were taken down by order of the Committee of National Liberation (CLNAI) in Milan; the city had just been liberated from the Axis troops and was not yet occupied by the Allies. The Committee, originally the underground anti-Fascist “Government ” of Northern Italy, was composed of representatives of all the important Italian political parties. It had attempted to prevent the hanging but had failed because it had insufficient police forces at its disposal. During this attempt fire hoses were turned on the crowd, but they also proved ineffective.

The population of Milan had been tyrannized and abused for long months by Mussolini and his regime of oppression and torture. Only a short time before, fifteen members of the Resistance had been executed on this very Piazza, which today bears the name “Place of the Fifteen Martyrs.” It is therefore understandable that the people of Milan were taking their pound of flesh.

Since the early days of December, 1944, Cardinal Ildefonso Schuster, Archbishop of Milan, had been considering ways and means to prevent the destruction of Milan and other cities in Lombardy as the war approached its final phase and the Axis armies were being driven back towards the Swiss frontier. The Cardinal finally asked Herr Rahn, the German Ambassador with the Neo-Fascist Government, to communicate to Hitler his fervent hope that the German authorities would not find it necessary to carry out any demolition in the city of Milan or any other important point in Lombardy.

In February, Mussolini said in one of his speeches that Lombardy would be defended at all costs. In April, soon after the start of the brilliant offensive by the Allied armies, the situation on the Italian front began to look hopeless for the Axis. The Germans were getting desperate and their emissaries were approaching anyone who was likely to have the ear of the CLNAI, in an effort to arrange for a surrender on terms better than “unconditional.” The Committee invariably replied that it would not negotiate unless the Germans accepted beforehand the principle of unconditional surrender. The Fascist Government finally became aware of these efforts; and beginning on April 22, 1945, several important Fascist officials tried to get in touch with the CLNAI. The Committee’s answer was always the same, with the further qualification that it had at least some confidence in the word of a German soldier, while it had none in that of a Fascist dignitary.

Copyright 1945, by The Atlantic Monthly Company, Boston 16, Mass. All rights reserved.

Events were gradually moving to a climax. On April 24 the Committee had one of its clandestine meetings and decided to call a general strike to begin on the following day.

The strike broke out in Milan on April 25 as planned, and the workers started occupying the factories. The Germans’ effort to control it was half-hearted as there were several hundred factories to protect — a task which would have split their garrison into many small units, The Committee then decided to start a military revolt on the following day and to occupy public buildings, utilities, and other strategic points.

On April 25, Cardinal Schuster was told that Mussolini had requested to see him that afternoon because, the intermediary said, Il Duce was willing to sign an unconditional surrender. The Cardinal arranged for the representatives of CLNAI, including General Raffaele Cadorna, Commander-in-Chief of the “Partisans,” the military arm of the Committee, to meet with him and Mussolini. This historic meeting in the Cardinal’s Palace merely showed that Il Duce was not yet ready to surrender unconditionally. After a somewhat heated debate he left the meeting, promising to give a final answer by 8.00 P.M. of that day. Instead, he and the majority of his cabinet fled Milan for an unknown destination.

The Committee of National Liberation then told the Cardinal that it was taking over the government — the Germans had already offered to surrender unconditionally and the Fascist Government was in flight. Milan fell to the liberation movement without organized fighting. The German troops remained in their billets, and there were only separate encounters with a few isolated Fascist troops. The victorious forces of the CLNAI had only a handful of casualties.

2

IT WAS to Como, near the Swiss border, that Mussolini fled after the unsuccessful conference with Cardinal Schuster. With him went a number of his Ministers, among them Marshal Graziani, and other members of his entourage. Altogether there were perhaps fifteen passenger cars and one or two vehicles carrying several German soldiers armed with machine guns. Graziani had his usual escort of one car carrying armed Italian guards.

Mussolini, who was in a foul temper, went to the Prefettura and asked for Signor Celio, Fascist Prefect of Como and head of the Province. Il Duce was incensed at the manner, “unbefitting the Chief of the State,” in which he said he had been treated at the Milan meeting, He asserted it was a low attempt to trick him into accepting something which by its very nature was unacceptable.

At the Prefettura, Mussolini held conferences with several of his Ministers. At one point Celio remained alone with Il Duce and used the opportunity to obtain consent for the creation of a free hospital zone from Como to Lanzo d’Intelvi. This zone, it was hoped, would be spared from fighting. Celio mentioned that the success of this project depended upon “all important political personages” leaving the territory. Il Duce answered that he understood and fully agreed. Shortly afterwards he said he realized that all was lost. When Celio asked what his immediate plans were, Mussolini answered that he was still undecided. Celio suggested that he should ask Switzerland for asylum. Mussolini said he had been notified that Switzerland would not accept him. Celio suggested that another at tempt be made, using the services of the American Consul in Lugano. Il Duce grew angry and said he would have nothing to do with Switzerland. It was close to midnight by that time.

At that moment Francesco Barracu came in and told Mussolini that, despite all the efforts, the “small truck” could not be found. Mussolini flew into a rage and worked himself almost into a fit. He was reproaching Barracu and others that no one had taken the trouble to see to it that this truck with its extremely important documents and the woman who rode in it were safely following him on the trip from Milan. At one point he shouted that it was his tragic destiny for the last twenty-five years to have to attend himself to any important matters — otherwise they would not have been taken care of.

Presently Mussolini called for Graziani, presumably to get his advice regarding the military situation and the plans for the immediate future. Celio had tried beforehand to gain Graziani’s support in convincing Mussolini that he should go to Switzerland.