But by the end of the Hu Jintao era, Deng’s wisdom was either forgotten or ignored, perhaps because Beijing over-read the implications of the 2008 global financial crisis and, just as the United States had over-read the end of the Cold War, invested it with a universal significance as heralding Marx’s long-predicted decline and eventual collapse of the West, specifically the United States.

By virtue of its size, contiguity, economic weight, and crucial role in the world economy, China will always enjoy considerable influence in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. But for those same reasons, China will also always arouse anxieties in Asia and indeed the world. Deng Xiaoping’s approach of hiding China’s power and biding time stems from his awareness of this paradox. Big countries need to reassure small countries on their periphery. Deng recognized this and acted on it.

By virtue of its size, contiguity, economic weight, and crucial role in the world economy, China will always enjoy considerable influence in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. But for those same reasons, China will also always arouse anxieties in Asia and indeed the world. Deng Xiaoping’s approach of hiding China’s power and biding time stems from his awareness of this paradox. Big countries need to reassure small countries on their periphery. Deng recognized this and acted on it.

But by the end of the Hu Jintao era, Deng’s wisdom was either forgotten or ignored, perhaps because Beijing over-read the implications of the 2008 global financial crisis and, just as the United States had over-read the end of the Cold War, invested it with a universal significance as heralding Marx’s long-predicted decline and eventual collapse of the West, specifically the United States.

The book cover for The Myth of the Asian Century

In July 2010, at a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Hanoi, then-Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi imperiously proclaimed: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.” Yang was reported to have been looking at the Singaporean foreign minister when he issued this warning because Singapore had been audacious enough to defy Chinese wishes by talking about the South China Sea.

In September 2005, Zheng Bijian, an influential intellectual and senior advisor to the Chinese government, published an article in Foreign Affairs titled “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status.” This became the dominant theme in Chinese foreign policy discourse, though “rise” was later deemed too provocative and replaced by “development.” China recognized that falling out with the United States and its allies could derail China’s growth.

But after Xi Jinping took power in 2012, “peaceful development” faded from the Chinese foreign policy lexicon. Instead, the dominant note was struck by the slogan “the East rising and the West declining.” China became more aggressive, not just in the South China Sea but against Hong Kong, in the East China Sea, around Taiwan and Australia, and in the Himalayas. This has raised anxiety levels across Asia.

It does not, however, follow that Asia will meekly submit to China’s wishes. ASEAN members have continued to discuss the South China Sea. The United States has continued to conduct regular freedom of navigation operations in the area. Japan, Australia, and India have conducted naval patrols. Britain, France, Germany, and other European countries have also occasionally sent their naval vessels to the South China Sea, investing the issue with an international dimension that Beijing had tried to avoid.

A helicopter on the deck of a ship against a night sky.

An important but inadequately recognized development over the last three decades has been an unarticulated but perceptible shift of attitude towards the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia in response to anxieties about China. Diplomatic partnerships such as the Quad (between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), security agreements such AUKUS (the Australia-United Kingdom-United States pact), Japan’s increase in defense spending and more proactive external posture, and India’s