The escalation risk comes not just from actual U.S. decapitation strikes but from any U.S. actions that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership view as attempts, or even preparations, for decapitation. Chinese misinterpretation of U.S. actions could lead to an escalation spiral, including Chinese nuclear first use. While it is unlikely that the United States can fully allay Chinese fears, there are steps the U.S. military can take to reduce the risks. These include being particularly cautious about any strikes around Beijing during a potential conflict, evaluating the impact of potential U.S. acquisitions on Chinese perceptions, and clearly communicating that any strike on mainland China would be for stopping an invasion of Taiwan, not decapitation.

When Chinese military planners, and probably even the Chinese leadership itself, think about a hypothetical future war with the United States, they are very likely worried that the U.S. military will attempt to decapitate the Chinese leadership. This may sound far-fetched to Americans, but there is very strong evidence that Beijing really does worry about U.S. decapitation strikes—and that these fears mean a U.S.-China conflict runs higher escalation risks than previously understood.

When Chinese military planners, and probably even the Chinese leadership itself, think about a hypothetical future war with the United States, they are very likely worried that the U.S. military will attempt to decapitate the Chinese leadership. This may sound far-fetched to Americans, but there is very strong evidence that Beijing really does worry about U.S. decapitation strikes—and that these fears mean a U.S.-China conflict runs higher escalation risks than previously understood.

The escalation risk comes not just from actual U.S. decapitation strikes but from any U.S.