Many U.S. think tank analysts and policy experts often assess the threat to Taiwan’s silicon shield through an external lens, focusing on Beijing’s accelerating push for semiconductor self-reliance and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC) diversification into overseas markets such as Arizona .

U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick sent shock waves through Taipei when he declared in late September that Washington could not guarantee that it would defend Taiwan unless the island agreed to a 50-50 split of its semiconductor production with the United States. The concept of a “silicon shield”—the idea that global dependence on Taiwan’s chips enhances its security—has long shaped perceptions of Taiwan’s strategic value to the world. Lutnick’s blunt statement flipped that logic: Far from being a shield, Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production was cast as a liability for the United States.

U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick sent shock waves through Taipei when he declared in late September that Washington could not guarantee that it would defend Taiwan unless the island agreed to a 50-50 split of its semiconductor production with the United States. The concept of a “silicon shield”—the idea that global dependence on Taiwan’s chips enhances its security—has long shaped perceptions of Taiwan’s strategic value to the world. Lutnick’s blunt statement flipped that logic: Far from being a shield, Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production was cast as a liability for the United States.

Many U.S. think tank analysts and policy experts often assess the threat to Taiwan’s silicon shield through an external lens, focusing on Beijing’s accelerating push for semiconductor self-reliance and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC) diversification into overseas markets such as Arizona.

However, the true fragility of the silicon shield lies not in Arizona or Beijing, but within T