House of cards on water: Why Cyprus-Lebanon deal will not hold

The images out of Baabda Palace this week were meant to project a diplomatic breakthrough: smiling leaders, signed documents, and confident statements about “stability.” But the core question remains: does the Greek Cyprus-Lebanon maritime deal rest on solid legal and geopolitical foundations, or on a political moment that cannot survive scrutiny?

Despite being marketed as “historic,” the agreement sits uneasily with established maritime principles, the political climate on the island, and the broader strategic geometry of the Eastern Mediterranean. It is a deal shaped more by regional alignments and immediate optics rather than geography and long-term viability. In essence, this is an agreement that attempts to fix an Eastern Mediterranean order that ignores Türkiye. And it speaks the language of stability while eroding the very foundations of trust required to achieve it.

Legal ground or lack thereof

This legal blind spot is exactly where Ankara’s objections come in. The agreement assumes that Greek Cyprus can project a full Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) toward Lebanon as though it were an uncontested, unified entity. International maritime law is more complex. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) jurisprudence consistently prioritizes equity, proportionality, and the weight of relevant coastlines