Pakistan’s 27th Amendment Upends Its Nuclear Command

At its core, the amendment is a move to constitutionally enshrine the army’s supremacy under the guise of modernization. Since Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz party solidified its power via a 2024 election that was widely viewed as fixed , their government has leaned on the military establishment for support and, in turn, shown a great willingness to reinforce the army’s institutional dominance.

Pakistan’s steady descent into authoritarianism continued last month with the passage of its 27th constitutional amendment.

At its core, the amendment is a move to constitutionally enshrine the army’s supremacy under the guise of modernization. Since Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz party solidified its power via a 2024 election that was widely viewed as fixed, their government has leaned on the military establishment for support and, in turn, shown a great willingness to reinforce the army’s institutional dominance.

The new amendment restructures Pakistan’s national security architecture under the newly created title of the chief of defense forces, a role that will be held by the army chief, Asim Munir. It also creates a commander of the National Strategic Command (CNSC), a new four-star position intended to oversee strategic planning and readiness across the services. While the prime minister formally appoints the CNSC, the nomination must come from the army chief. By design, the role will be filled exclusively by an army officer.

While supporters describe the amendment as a step toward integrated defense coordination and clearer civil-military structures, critics argue that it instead constitutionally cements the army’s supremacy across joint military affairs. While debate in Islamabad has so far focused on the amendment’s domestic implications and the acceleration of democratic backsliding, the implications