Flexible pragmatism in Russia-Türkiye energy ties in 2026

As 2025 drew to a close, energy relations between Russia and Türkiye have shifted beyond the traditional supplier-consumer framework. They are now positioned at a fragile threshold where geopolitical balancing and commercial pragmatism increasingly intersect. Europe’s post-Ukraine war disengagement from Russian gas has pushed Moscow to rely more heavily on a limited number of large, infrastructure-rich markets such as Türkiye. At the same time, Ankara, supported by expanding LNG capacity, a more diversified supply portfolio, and its ambition to become an energy trading hub, has entered a phase of redefining the rigidity of long-term gas contracts. This condition of mutual necessity, as the parties move toward 2026, compels them into a flexible, interest-based equilibrium that allows neither a full strategic rupture nor a return to the former structure of dependency. Türkiye's decreasing dependence For many years, Türkiye has exhibited a high degree of dependence on Russia for natural gas imports. Particularly during the 2010s, the share of Russian gas in Türkiye’s total imports reached the range of 40%-45% and in some years approached nearly half of the total supply. This period reflected a balance in which long-term, oil-indexed contracts with take-or-pay obligations, primarily via the Western Line and Blue Stream, formed the backbone of Türkiye’s supply security. By the mid-2020s, however, this structure had changed markedly. With the expansion of LNG infrastructure, investments in floating storage and regasification units, the growing role of Azerbaijani gas, and improved access to spot markets, Russia’s share in Türkiye’s total natural gas imports declined to approximately 35%-38% by 2025. In absolute terms, Türkiye continues to import roughly 15 to 18 billion cubic meters of gas annually from Russia, which still positions Russia as Türkiye’s largest single supplier. Yet this trade no longer represents a one-sided dependency. Instead, Russian gas has become a commercially and geopolitically managed component within Türkiye’s increasingly diversified energy portfolio. This transformation clearly reflects Türkiye’s transition from dependency to balance, and from long-term obligation to selective pragmatism in its energy relations with Russia. Europe-Russia energy relations When examined more closely, Berlin’s decision to terminate Russian gas imports emerged not only as a strategic choice but also as a forced rupture. In the initial phase, physical gas flows were cut, followed by the rapid commissioning of LNG terminals at unprecedented speed, alongside the temporary retention of coal and even nuclear power plants within the energy system. On the industrial side, this transition resulted in production declines, permanent capacity losses in certain sectors, and persistently high energy costs. Energy-intensive industrial firms such as BASF shifted investments outside Europe, while the German economy hovered near stagnation during the 2023 to 2024 period. This experience clearly demonstrated that the economic cost of exiting Russian gas was substantial for Germany. Although Europe’s stance on abandoning Russian gas appears resolute at the level of political rhetoric, in practice, it has taken the form of a restructured dependency rather than a complete disengagement. Following the Ukraine-Russia war, the European Union largely removed Russian pipeline gas from its energy system. However, this step did not imply a reduction in energy consumption. Instead, it resulted in an aggressive entry into the global LNG market. International Energy Agency data indicate that Europe’s exit from Russian gas was achieved primarily through source substitution rather than demand elimination. While total gas demand declined, LNG’s share within the system reached historical highs. In this context, the clearest beneficiary of the war has been the global LNG market, where geopolitical risk premiums have been priced in, and long-term contractual structures have regained prominence. Between 2022 and 2024, the United States, in particular, along with Qatar and other LNG exporters, secured a lasting position in the European market, with both spot and long-term contracts expanding rapidly. While this development enhanced short-term supply security for Europe, it also resulted in higher energy costs and weakened industrial competitiveness. Consequently, Europe’s claim of abandoning Russian gas on moral and strategic grounds struggles to withstand closer scrutiny when the high premiums paid for LNG and the absence of a comprehensive ban on Russian LNG are taken into account. While pipeline gas is rejected, the continued presence of the same molecule in LNG form or through indirect trade channels demonstrates that EU policy has been driven more by crisis management considerations than by ideological consistency. Future of LNG market Could these balances shift rapidly under a potential peace scenario? Proposals such as the...

Flexible pragmatism in Russia-Türkiye energy ties in 2026

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