Afghanistan under Taliban: power without a state

. The writer is a public policy analyst based in Lahore. She can be reached at durdananajam1@gmail.com More than four years after the Taliban returned to Kabul, Afghanistan presents an unusual political experiment: a regime that has successfully monopolised power but has yet to evolve into a functioning state. The latest assessment by the UNSC's Monitoring Team underscores a central paradox of Taliban rule — the pursuit of absolute ideological control has strengthened authority at the top while hollowing out the very institutions needed for durable governance. At the heart of the system lies an unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of Hibatullah Akhundzada. Unlike modern authoritarian leaders who rely on party structures, militaries or technocratic bureaucracies, Akhundzada governs primarily through religious authority. His leadership style reflects a deliberate rejection of institutional politics. Kandahar, not Kabul, serves as the nerve centre of decision-making, reinforcing a model in which legitimacy flows from clerical decree rather than administrative performance or public consent. This approach has produced short-term cohesion but long-term fragility. Centralisation has minimised open dissent, yet it has also paralysed policy innovation. Ministries function largely as implementers of orders rather than problem-solving bodies. Even senior officials are constrained by an environment in which debate is viewed as disobedience and deviation as heresy. As a result, governance has become reactive, rigid and opaque. The Taliban's internal structure further complicates this picture. While the leadership projects unity, power is unevenly distributed across factions. Kandahar-based clerics dominate ideological direction, while networks such as the Haqqanis retain operational autonomy, particularly in security matters. This arrangement has allowed the regime to maintain internal balance, but it has also created a dual system in which authority is centralised in theory and fragmented in practice. The absence of a clearly articulated succession framework adds to this uncertainty. In a system so dependent on a single figure, leadership continuity is a structural vulnerability. History suggests that movements built on personal authority rather than institutional rules often struggle during transitions, and Afghanistan's current model offers few safeguards against internal rupture should that moment arrive. One of the most revealing aspects of Taliban governance is its approach to dissent within its own ranks. Religious scholars and senior officials who questioned policies — particularly on girls' education — have been sidelined or removed. This indicates not merely political intolerance but a narrowing of acceptable religious interpretation itself. By criminalising internal theological debate, the regime risks undermining the scholarly traditions that once gave Afghan religious life its diversity and resilience. Nowhere is the tension between ideology and functionality more visible than in the education sector. The Taliban's decision to place education directly under the supreme leader's authority reflects an understanding that ideas, not just territory, shape power. However, the systematic removal of civic, legal, economic and social sciences from curricula represents a strategic gamble. By hollowing out disciplines essential for administration, markets and diplomacy, the regime is sacrificing future capacity for present control. The continued exclusion of girls from education is not only a humanitarian concern but a governance dilemma. Afghanistan's economy, already under severe strain, cannot afford the long-term productivity losses that such a policy entails. More importantly, the issue has become a fault line within the movement itself, highlighting the gap between ideological absolutism and social realities in a country with deep-rooted traditions of religious pluralism. The Taliban's security record illustrates a similar pattern of partial success and underlying risk. The reduction in large-scale violence and containment of ISIL-K demonstrate improved territorial control. Yet security gains rest on informal arrangements with multiple armed groups, many of which retain distinct ideological identities. The integration of former fighters into security forces has boosted numbers but diluted professionalism, increasing the likelihood of fragmentation under pressure. Economic governance remains the regime's weakest pillar. Afghanistan today survives less on production than on restraint — limited spending, humanitarian inflows and modest revenue collection. With unemployment soaring and the majority of the population dependent on aid, the state's social contract is virtually non-existent. Restrictions on female participation in aid delivery have further strained humanitarian operations, while large-scale returns of displaced Afghans have overwhelmed local capacities. Crucially, the...

Afghanistan under Taliban: power without a state

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