In one of his most perplexing recent initiatives, US President Donald Trump has overseen the capture and removal to US custody of Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and his wife, while declaring Washington will βrunβ Venezuela even though it has no troops there. Mr Trump seems to be relying on latter-day gunboat diplomacy, and what amounts to rule by implicit intimidation rather than direct occupation. Concerns are widespread that the Trump administration may be acting without sufficient planning, with perhaps only the re-conquest of Venezuelan oil resources meaningfully thought through.
The present-day and fully realised seizure of Mr Maduro and the not-at-all realised seizure of Venezuela have some obvious precursors, but none appear particularly instructive. In 1989, George HW Bush sent 24,000 troops to impose American will on the relatively tiny country of Panama after its then-leader, Manuel Noriega, turned on his long-time US allies. He was brought to the US and convicted on drug charges similar to those awaiting Mr Maduro and his wife. They are also similar to the drug smuggling charges that Juan Orlando Hernandez, the former president of Honduras, was convicted of in 2024 and pardoned for by Mr Trump last month. Consistency was never a hallmark of Trumpian policies.
Washington had a long-term significant military presence in Panama, while it has no comparable troops or deep history of control in Venezuela. Noriega had little external support, while Cuba is a crucial mentor in heavy-handedness to the Venezuelan establishment set up by Mr Maduroβs predecessor, the late Hugo Chavez. In 2013, Mr Maduro inherited an intricate system of national control based on interlocking alliances between his self-styled βBolivarian revolutionaryβ political base with drug-running generals and nationwide street gangs known as βcolectivosβ.
This nightmare of pervasive repression, endemic self-enrichment and systematised corruption created sufficient socio-economic pressure to prop up a Latin-American equivalent of Bashar Al Assadβs Syria, with cocaine instead of captagon. Precious few Venezuelans will shed a tear for Mr and Mrs Maduro, but the only practical step clearly articulated by Mr Trump is the proposed US seizure of the vast Venezuelan petroleum industry (Opec was founded in 1960 by a coalition of Venezuela and Gulf countries) β a move that would probably be overwhelmingly unpopular and therefore rejected by any plausible alternative government. Mr Trump claims Venezuelan oil has been βstolenβ from the US, but few in Venezuela would agree.
US faces $100bn bill to transform Venezuela oil sector to βformer gloryβ 02:30
How does Mr Trump propose to βrun Venezuelaβ with the existing system fully intact and no US forces on the ground? Largely through intimidation, apparently. Washington seems to agree that Mr Maduro has been lawfully succeeded by his vice president, Delcy Rodriguez. She has reportedly been in talks with the architect of this policy, US Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio, and Mr Trump says heβs convinced that sheβs βessentially willing to do what we think is necessary in order to make Venezuela great againβ.
Though Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia convincingly claimed an overwhelming victory in the July 2024 presidential election, Mr Trump has ignored him and dismissed his principal backer and last yearβs Nobel Peace Laureate, MarΓa Corina Machado, as unfit while she insists that Mr Gonzales is the legitimate president. There are no apparent plans for a new election in Venezuela. Instead, the βBolivarianβ system is chugging along, much as it would have if Mr Maduro had suddenly passed away of natural causes.
Mr Trump is insisting on US control of Venezuelaβs oil resources, which are still embargoed by Washington, on the grounds that they were βstolenβ from American petrochemical companies in the 20th century.
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