Europe’s Rearmament Paradox

The numbers tell the story. As of November 2025 , only 16 percent of Europeans surveyed by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) still considered the United States an ally, down from 22 percent eight months earlier. Twenty percent now view the United States as a “rival” or “adversary,” approaching 30 percent in Germany, France, and Spain. Yet this growing anti-American sentiment has not translated into enthusiasm for European strategic autonomy. Far from it.

European leaders face a puzzle that defies the usual political logic. As U.S. reliability collapses under the second Trump administration, one might expect those Europeans most alarmed by American hostility to become the strongest advocates for autonomous European defense. Instead, the opposite pattern prevails. The constituencies most willing to invest in European rearmament are precisely those that still believe NATO can be salvaged—while those who have concluded that the United States is now an adversary are the least willing to bear the costs of replacing American protection.

European leaders face a puzzle that defies the usual political logic. As U.S. reliability collapses under the second Trump administration, one might expect those Europeans most alarmed by American hostility to become the strongest advocates for autonomous European defense. Instead, the opposite pattern prevails. The constituencies most willing to invest in European rearmament are precisely those that still believe NATO can be salvaged—while those who have concluded that the United States is now an adversary are the least willing to bear the costs of replacing American protection.

The numbers tell the story. As of November 2025, only 16 percent of Europeans surveyed by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) still considered the United States an ally, down from 22 percent eight months earlier. Twenty percent now view the United States as a “rival” or “adversary,” approaching 30 percent in Germany, France, and Spain.