The day after

BALOCHISTAN witnessed a series of coordinated attacks on the weekend. Though details continue to be sketchy, a number of cities in the province were targeted, including Quetta, Gwadar and Noshki. It was reported that the attacks were repulsed and over 100 terrorists killed (the number continues to rise). Nonetheless the multiple events on Saturday morning have once again drawn attention to a conflict in our midst that everyone prefers to overlook. Around a year ago, the province had experienced a similar spate of coordinated attacks in August 2024 on Akbar Bugti’s death anniversary. And for this reason for most of August 2025, there was a security clampdown in the province, with little to no internet coverage to prevent a repeat. The government ensured August passed quietly, only for January to turn explosive. The attack had apparently begun much earlier than it was reported on the mainstream media, which is understandable at one level. The security organisations want to get the situation under control before it is reported so that the spread of misinformation and disinformation is limited. But in this day and age, the downside was that for a few hours, the information flow was dominated by the other side (on social media) while mainstream media in Pakistan kept running routine news of politicians and their speeches. The latter was of little interest to those who were busy scrolling on their phones. The attacks have again set off a debate in which one side views the attacks as the desperate acts of externally supported militants who achieve very little eventually. On the other side is the view that such attacks show the weakening of the state’s writ and its ability to maintain normalcy in territory (which is different from losing it) and its ‘ability’ to win over the people. The insurgency has been ongoing for 20 years now, the longest of any in Balochistan. The province’s chief minister was on a talk show on Sunday evening where he argued that the attacks were an act of desperation because the terrorists had suffered considerable losses in the past year. He claimed that operations in the past year had eliminated around 1,000 of them and added that the total number of terrorists and facilitators was not more than 5,000 to 6,000. At a later stage, he said, according to a survey by the government, only two or three per cent of the ordinary people supported the militants. He also described the insurgency as the swings of the pendulum and explained that appeasement in the near past had led to the terrorists becoming stronger; the appeasement was blamed on past civilian governments which did not support the military. But the pendulum argument does not explain how this crisis will end — after all, this insurgency has been ongoing for 20 years now, the longest of any in Balochistan. And neither does it explain the increasing lethality of the attacks; most experts agree the militants are becoming more lethal and better trained with time. And neither does it throw light on their increasing success in recruiting educated, middle-class youth. Perhaps this is why the insurgency has continued for so long; instead of being led by individual tribal sardars, it is now being fuelled by a class which is proving more resilient. This educated class includes women some of whom are now seen as involved in the fighting as well. These issues will need to be explored in more detail than simply focusing on the external support being provided. It is not enough to rejoice in the terrorists’ inability to hold on to territory but to ask why there is no normalcy in large swathes of the province, including its seat of government in Quetta. From one angle, instead of a pendulum swing, it might appear to be a steep decline. Here, it is also important to address two more difficult questions. One is to ask how the imprisonment of women protesters, such as Mahrang Baloch, has helped with the security situation as it sends out the message that peaceful protests are not acceptable — leading many to conclude that for those who feel their voices are not being heard, violence is the only option. Second, is the issue of genuine representation in the province, which is also inextricably linked to the popularity of women protesters. For there is a connection between the people of Balochistan opting for peaceful protests (and more) and the perceived unfairness of the elections in the province. The widespread disillusionment with the electoral process has led many people to look at protests and violence as a means of influencing the state. And regardless of how legitimate or illegitimate the methods are seen to be, and the way to deal with them, it is essential that people be enticed back to the electoral process. And this is a problem that has become a widespread crisis of faith. This was brought home last year when I was able to visit Quetta with the HRCP. It was evident that nearly every political party complained of unfair elections....

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