What happens after militants hang up their guns?

Earlier this year, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced a unilateral ceasefire in response to calls from its jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan. This was a second attempt at the so-called solution process between Turkey and the PKK that began in 2013 and collapsed in the summer of 2015 when Ankara and the militants slid back into open conflict.

That first attempt exposed the dangers of ambiguity and overexposure around the mechanics of such a process. This time, the emphasis is on substance rather than theatre. Negotiations have been conducted in secrecy to limit the impact of spoilers, and Ankara now feels confident enough to draft a law to structure PKK disarmament and returns.

This legislative move is a real step forward – but success ultimately depends on clear rules. If anchored in broad parliamentary support, the law can help build public backing and narrow the space for saboteurs. If it codifies roles, timelines and protections – while an independent body verifies weapons inventories and site closures – compliance becomes a safer and more attractive option than defection.

A mother’s hope for her missing daughter: Will PKK fighters ever come home? 04:20

In a broader sense, the PKK–Turkey experience could be instructive. It may have positive implications for other armed groups that are debating their future, including Hamas and Hezbollah. It will show that stepping away from armed struggle is less a clean break than a drawn-out negotiation that works only when three things are in place: credible security guarantees; realistic routes into legal politics; and genuine economic alternatives to wartime networks. Where those conditions are weak or absent, ex-combatants are more likely to splinter, remobilise or slip into criminality.

For the PKK-Turkey experience to succeed it is imperative that Ankara’s statute explicitly does three things. First, it should provide a credible, state-backed guarantee of protection so former PKK participants are not punished by vigilantes, criminal spoilers or the rebranding of cooperation as confession.

Second, it should define a clear legal path to civilian status that sets out eligibility, obligations and the limits of prosecution in a way that courts will uphold. Third, it should fund reintegration that links ex-combatants to real employers and real communities, rather than temporary stipends or isolated camps that reinforce former fighters’ isolation.

Reintegration must be carefully designed and planned in advance if the rest of the process is to work effectively. Fighters with limited schooling and years outside formal economies will struggle to secure employment. They will need documentation, health screening, legal orientation, a modest allowance and immediate placement in education, training or work.

Colombia’s peace process between the government and the Farc rebel group is instructive here. Producer co-operatives and apprenticeships flourished where there was technical assistance, credit and guaranteed buyers. However, killings of ex-combatants in unprotected areas showed that income without safety is a bridge to nowhere.